System and method for pricing and allocation of commodities or securities

ABSTRACT

An auction server node is described for a computer network having user nodes for conducting an auction run by an auction adviser for awarding securities from an issuer to bidders of the auction. There is real-time monitoring of the auction as it occurs, a bid mechanism for receiving competitive bids from the bidders at the user nodes, including a quantity of securities to be purchased, an initial price revealed to the other bidders, and a firm price not revealed to the other bidders and within a predetermined range of the initial price. A single market clearing price is determined that allocates to the bidders all of the securities in the auction. An incremental adjustment of the market clearing price may be made by at least one of the auction advisor and the issuer, and an allocation made of the securities to the bidders at the adjusted clearing price.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a divisional of U.S. patent application Ser. No.09/668,255 now U.S. Pat No. 7,415,436, filed Sep. 21, 2000, which inturn claimed the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/187,800filed Mar. 8, 2000, which are hereby incorporated by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This invention relates to the field of Internet computer systems andprocesses. More specifically, the invention is a method and apparatusfor pricing and allocation of commodity or security issues through useof an Internet based control system.

BACKGROUND

It is desirable that the process of buying and selling initial offeringsand large regulated blocks of commodities or securities (hereinafter“securities”) be made more accessible to more investors, be made moreprice transparent by providing more visibility into the bid and offerprocess, reduce the costs to issuers and investors and increase theamount of trading in these securities.

The present system of offering new issues of securities isnon-transparent, inefficient and biased toward certain buyers andbroker-dealers. As used herein, “securities” include equity securities,commodities (as traded on a licensed commodity exchange), fixed incomeor debt securities including, for example and without limitation,corporate bonds, municipal bonds, mortgage backed bonds, emerging marketbonds, junk bonds, treasury bonds, convertible bonds, gold, and thelike. These will be generally referred to as “securities.”

While the following describes the technical problem in terms of debtsecurities, the general issues relate to the sale of regulatedsecurities, commodities and other similar assets. Those skilled in thesearts will recognize that the technical problem described specifically isa general one which may be solved within the letter and spirit of theinvention disclosed herein.

It is typical for a municipality, corporation, or other non-US treasuryissuer to sell its securities by having an investment bank, or otherbroker, underwrite an offering. Typically, corporate bond syndicationsuse an investment bank's salesmen to convey the terms of a pendingoffering to potential investors along with some preliminary, unofficial“price talk.” In this way, a dialogue is initiated with investors thatis intended to garner feedback concerning pricing and investor interest.This feedback is shared with the issuer and other investors.

This process is generally referred to as “book building.” Book buildingis iterative and filtered: a sort of oral history of the “book,” listinginterested investors and the quantity of securities in which they areostensibly interested, is told, retold and modified until the offeringor “deal” is as big and as cheap as the issuer will tolerate. The dealis then priced by the syndicate and the issuer enters into a writtenagreement with the underwriter to make the offering. Thus, generally, nowritten commitment to actually make the offering is made by the issueruntil after the offering is priced and subscribed. After the initialissue has been through this initial sale process, the securities arefreed to trade in the “secondary” market, that is, the market in whichsecurities other than new issues are traded. The issuer of thesecurities will typically pay fees to the underwriter for its marketing,pricing and allocation services.

In this initial sale system, market size and market price are controlledby the syndicate. And, as discussed below, the syndicate may wish tomassage market size and price in order to accomplish a set of objectiveswhich may belong to the underwriter or some subset of participantsrather than the issuer and the market at large. Certain investors may befavored by an underwriter, such that other investors who express aninterest in purchasing such bonds in an initial offering will have nocertainty that they will be allocated any bonds by the syndicate desk.Additionally, a deal will typically become several times oversubscribed,that is, more securities will be desired by investors than are beingoffered by the issuer.

Potential investors are typically aware of this and, so, will indicate aquantity of securities to the syndicate which may be many times theactual amount of securities desired by the investor. Because investorsunderstand that, in this traditional book building process, informationcan be filtered and massaged by the underwriter to achieve objectivesthat may differ from their own, investors tend to view this process withsuspicion and caution. Thus, investors may attempt to manipulate thesystem in their favor in a number of ways. For example, as noted above,potential investors may pad their orders, indicating interest in agreater volume of securities than they truly desire. Potential investorsmay also stipulate that an order will fall away if the price isincreased when, in fact, this simply represents posturing. The deal isthen managed to the “proper” price and size by the syndicate, often tomaximize fees and to please one constituent or another, but rarely toplease the market as a whole or to achieve the most efficient price anddistribution profile.

Because of all this attempted manipulation, the underwriter may not beable to get a good understanding of the true intentions of the potentialbuyers of the securities at the various potential price points. Behaviorof all parties is governed by an objective to manipulate the system byusing the filtering process to get the upper hand. Thus, it can be thecase that, once the real market price is established in secondarytrading, one constituency gains at the expense of another, leading tofurther mistrust of the system.

Recent conditions in the marketplace for debt securities amplify theneed for a change in how these securities are bought and sold. Forexample, technology has become easily available to conduct electronicsales (by auctions, etc.) that promotes unfiltered price discovery on alow-cost, real-time basis. Secondly, debt investors and issuers havebecome financially more sophisticated in their knowledge of markets,their ability to analyze credit quality and their ability to recognizevalue in the market. This means that they are less dependent onfinancial intermediaries for research and advice than they were in thepast. Third, the amount of investable funds in the market has growndramatically over the past decade, creating intense competition for newdebt issues within the investor community and creating a need for abetter market clearing process. Fourth, the services provided bytraditional investment banks related to the new debt issue theyoriginate have declined significantly, while the fees charged forservices rendered have remained constant. The most significant exampleof reduced service is the sharp decline in secondary market liquidityprovided by the traditional investment banks, largely the result of adecreased appetite for the risk amidst decreased profitability insecondary corporate bond trading. Finally, the current system encouragesmisrepresentations about the size and quality of the book, encouragesspecial interest deals and often creates major disputes regardingallocations which create a mistrust of the system, thereby causinginvestors and issuers to inflate values and amounts in a way whichexacerbates the hidden nature and inaccuracies of prices in the system.

With the advent of the Internet and reasonably secure telecommunicationssystems, various attempts are being made to use these systems for themanagement of investment portfolios for mutual funds and others and forsystems covering the sale and purchase of treasury bonds, corporatebonds and other securities in a way which avoids many of the describedproblems. Specifically in the area of bonds and other equities, forexample, we have seen various patented systems. One such attempt atportfolio management is described in the well publicized U.S. Pat. No.5,193,056 issued to Signature Financial Group on Mar. 9, 1993 titled“Data processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial ServicesConfiguration.” More specifically an attempt at automating the tradingof debt securities in the secondary market is described in U.S. Pat. No.5,809,483 issued Sep. 15, 1998 to S. William Broka et al, titled “OnlineTransaction processing System for Bond Trading.” Another system isdescribed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,946,667 issued Aug. 31, 1999 to MorganStanley Group titled “Data Processing System and Method for FinancialDebt Instruments.” This system is a system for investors to track theperformance of certain issued debt instruments within a limited periodof time and especially for implementing investor participation indomestic and foreign capital markets through positions in indexedvehicles which are packaged as debt instruments. Still another morerecent example of the use of the Internet to enhance general trading isfound in U.S. Pat. No. 6,023,686 issued Feb. 8, 2000 to Health HeroNetwork, titled “Method for Conducting an on-line Bidding Session withBid Pooling.” This system, while not aimed specifically at any specificsecurity market, is a system for allowing individuals to pool their bidsas a group in order to qualify to bid on a property in an on-lineauction. That is, it allows individuals with limited funds to pool theirresources with other individuals of limited resources to be able toqualify (i.e. have enough capital) to buy a piece of property that hasbeen auctioned.

Other known internet related systems for buying and selling securitiesand commodities include a system set up in 1992 by Intervest, aimed atfacilitating the secondary market sales of bonds between investors andbroker-dealers. More recently, Brokertec, a consortium set up by GoldmanSachs and six other large institutions in the summer of 1999 is said tobe trying to create an electronic inter-dealer broker for cash andfutures. Tradeweb, an electronic brokerage system for US Treasuries, wasset up by four investment banks (CSFB, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothersand Soloman Brothers) in 1997 and has apparently been successful intrading these securities. These Government bonds however do not have theproblems mentioned above in that they are heavily traded, their price iswell known in advance and are deemed the ultimate safe investment. Stillanother on-line system for handling bond trading, primarily in thesecondary market, is BondDesk.com owned by BondDesk.Com LLP, aninternet-based provider of retail fixed income trading software, andowned by BondExchange LLC, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Paine Webber Inc.,and Spear, Leeds & Kellog. Almost all of these systems which strive tooffer new issues follow the same logic; that is, they distributeresearch, prospectuses, filings and other new issue information over theweb, which cuts down on paper, faxes and some phone calls. However theultimate pricing and allocation of securities is still conducted viatraditional methods.

There is still a need for an Internet-based centralized system whichprovides a low-cost, open and decentralized price discovery environment.That is, a system using current technology to improve the transparencyof the price discovery process, eliminate mistrust, reduce the specialinterest money involved, and bring the cost of distribution moredirectly in line with the value added by the medium. The presentinvention provides a system to accomplish these goals and is applicableto the general securities and commodities transactions.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention overcomes the disadvantages of the above describedsystems by providing an economical, high performance, adaptable systemand method (designated “The OpenBook system”) for conducting an auctionof securities to institutional and individual investors on the Web. Inthe OpenBook system auction:

-   -   Bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early.    -   All winners pay a single market-clearing price that sells out        the securities.    -   All participants can monitor the auction in real time.

The OpenBook system thus creates a transparent and low-cost new issuemarket; offers all bidders equal access to securities; and gives bothinvestors and issuers a “seat on the syndicate desk.”

A computer implemented method for conducting an auction of securities onthe web is claimed whereby

Bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early.

All winners pay a single market-clearing price that sells out thesecurities.

All participants can monitor the auction in real time.

An apparatus for conducting an auction of securities on the web isclaimed whereby

Bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early.

All winners pay a single market-clearing price that sells out thesecurities.

All participants can monitor the auction in real time.

Also claimed is a network node in the Openbook system which is anauction server node in a network having a user node including a browserprogram coupled to the network, the user node providing requests forinformation and providing bidding input commands on said network, thenetwork node comprising:

-   -   an auction server node in the Openbook system responsive to a        request from the user node to participate in a securities        auction as a qualified bidder, whereby the openbook system        auction server node provides a bid mechanism through which        bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early,        and provides an allocation of securities which allows winning        bidders to pay a single market-clearing price that sells out the        offered securities, and provides a system whereby all        participating users can monitor the securities auction at the        user node.

Also claimed is a computer program product stored on a computed useablemedium, comprising;

-   -   computer readable program means for causing the computer to        conduct an auction of securities on the Web;    -   provide a bid mechanism whereby auction bidders are rewarded for        anonymously revealing their bids early;    -   provide an allocation of the securities which allows winning        bidders to pay a single market-clearing price that sells out the        securities; and    -   provide a system whereby all participants can monitor the        auction in real time.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a securities pricing and allocationsystem in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating processes which occur during anauction portion of the securities pricing and allocation systemillustrated in FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating an initial bidding process whichtakes place during an auction portion of the securities pricing andallocation system illustrated in FIG. 1.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a bid modification and final biddingprocess which takes place during an auction portion of the securitiespricing and allocation system illustrated in FIG. 1.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating a bond allocation process which ispart of the securities pricing and allocation system illustrated in FIG.1.

FIG. 6 is a high level view of the internet architecture.

FIG. 7 is a screen shot of the user interface showing the log-on screen.

FIG. 8 is a screen shot of the user interface showing an exemplary setof Initial Terms for a sample offering.

FIG. 9 is a screen shot of the user interface showing an exemplary setof auction details.

FIG. 10 is a screen shot of the user interface showing an exemplary setof in-progress auction details.

FIG. 11 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary set of in-progress auction details.

FIG. 12 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary set of in-progress bids and related time-stamps.

FIG. 13 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary Bid confirmation set of in-progress auction details.

FIG. 14 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary set of current bid status data with in-progress auctiondetails.

FIG. 15 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary request for confirmation of a bid modification entry with aset of in-progress auction details.

FIG. 16 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary warning screen indicating a time-stamp may be revised.

FIG. 17 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary successful purchase-auction over screen.

FIG. 18 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary unsuccessful purchase-auction over notice screen.

FIG. 19 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary details of a completed auction.

FIG. 20 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary error message relating to an improper bid size selectionduring an auction.

FIG. 21 is an additional screen shot of the user interface showing anexemplary attention message related to an attempt to cancel a bid duringan auction.

FIG. 22 is a flow chart of the high level physical layout architectureof the system containing the present invention.

FIG. 23 is a flow chart showing the details of the auction serverarchitecture of the system containing the present invention.

FIG. 24 is a flow chart showing further exemplary details of the systemsarchitecture of the preferred embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Overview

The present invention overcomes the disadvantages of the above describedsystems by providing an economical, high performance, adaptable systemand method (designated “the OpenBook system”) for conducting an auctionof securities to institutional and individual investors on the Web. Inthe OpenBook system auction:

-   -   Bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early.    -   All winners pay a single market-clearing price that sells out        the securities.    -   All participants can monitor the auction in real time.

The OpenBook system thus creates a transparent and low-cost new issuemarket; offers all bidders equal access to securities; and gives bothinvestors and issuers a “seat on the syndicate desk.”

Similarities to Traditional Investment Grade Offerings

The Openbook system auction process is similar to a traditionalinvestment grade debt security offering in the following respects:

-   -   The offering process will occur over 3-5 days from announcement        to closing    -   The issuer will have an effective shelf registration statement    -   The managing underwriters will sign a terms agreement with the        issuer    -   Co-managers will sign an agreement among underwriters    -   Dealers will sign a dealer agreement    -   A prospectus supplement will update the base prospectus with        terms of the securities issued    -   Securities will clear regular way (T+3), DVP (delivery versus        payment). Provisions are also provided for T+1 clearance in the        future.

The Underwriting Agreement, Terms Agreement and Prospectus Supplement

The participants in the OpenBook system agree prior to an auction thattheir bids are conditional offers that the managing underwriters canaccept once the auction is completed. In order to be able to immediatelyaccept such offers, the underwriters will need to enter into a termsagreement with the issuer prior to pricing with the followingprovisions:

-   -   The underwriter's purchase of securities will be conditioned on        a successful auction;    -   The auction will be bound by ranges for various terms, including        the interest rate spread, issue amount and maximum Treasury        rate;    -   The issuer, investors and underwriters will agree to abide by        auction rules posted on the OpenBook system site;    -   The definition of prospectus will include the electronic form of        the prospectus.

A system in accordance with the present invention is a system of pricedetermination and allocation of securities that can result insubstantial benefits for both companies seeking to raise capital throughthe sale of such securities and investors wishing to purchase suchsecurities. As noted in the Background section, as used herein,securities includes equity securities, debt vehicles such as, withoutlimitation, corporate or municipal bonds, mortgage backed bonds,emerging market bonds, junk bonds, commodities, gold, and money marketinstruments such as, without limitation, US treasury bills, bankcertificates of deposit, commercial paper, repurchase agreements and thelike. An investment vehicle offering using a pricing and distributionsystem in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the presentinvention differs substantially from either traditional underwritten orDutch auction security offerings. In offerings conducted in accordancewith the present invention, investment vehicles will generally be soldby an offering company at a price determined by investors bidding forthe vehicles using a Dutch auction type scheme. A Dutch auction isdescribed in Exxon Corp., 1977-78 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 81, 198at 88, 159 (avail. May 9, 1977) which explains:

-   -   The Dutch Auction differs in certain material respects from the        practice of competitive bidding. Principally, the bids which are        submitted need not cover the entire amount of the offering in        order to be accepted. Each bidder, including institutions and        individuals as well as registered broker-dealers, indicates the        amount of the offering which is wanted, and the yield. Each bid        received will, on the final date designated for entry of bids,        become an irrevocable offer to purchase the amount of bonds        indicated unless the bid is withdrawn.

In addition, the offering price is based upon the yields specified inthe bids. After closing the invitation period, the bids are listed inascending order of yields. The bid with the lowest yield is acceptedfirst, and then other bids at successively higher yields are accepted upto those bids with the highest yield required to reach the total amountof the offering. The highest accepted yield is the yield at which allthe bonds are awarded. Upon determination of the yield, the interestrate and price are fixed by the issuer. The securities will be awardedto the successful bidders at a uniform price based upon the acceptedyield.

However, not all difficulties are alleviated using the Dutch auctionmethod. Using either a traditional book building or a Dutch auctiontechnique, the issuer generally does not enter into any type of bindingagreement to issue the bonds until after investors have demonstratedinterest or the auction has run and pricing takes place. Thus, evenafter expressing interest or, in a Dutch auction, placing a bid, theissuer could still decide not to issue any bonds, leaving investorsuncertain that they would receive any bonds until after final pricing.

Moreover, the value of a security is an almost exclusive function of themarket for the security. And, both the traditional book building methodand the Dutch auction method described above provide an imperfectindication of what the actual market value of a particular fixed incomesecurity might be because of the closed nature of the process. Forexample, there is no quote system for the bond market to allow potentialinvestors to gain an idea of what a new issue might be worth.Additionally, there is no mechanism for a potential purchaser to gaininformation about what the issuer or other potential purchasers believethe particular security is worth or the amount of securities that anissuer will offer until after a price has been set and the security hasbeen purchased. Finally, similar deal sizes for similar grade securitiesmay have different demand at different points in time depending on anynumber of outside factors. Thus, past demand for a particular type ofsecurity is not necessarily a good indicator of future demand for asimilar offering. Accordingly, there is an inherent lack of certaintyfor investors when purchasing these types of securities usingtraditional methods. While a type of Dutch auction is used in thepresent invention, this auction is an “open” auction as opposed to a“closed” (sealed bid) type auction used by others.

In the preferred embodiment, Information concerning the offering such asa range in which the final yield will be set and a range of totaloffering size is preferably provided prior to the auction. Additionally,potential investors will be able to receive feedback concerning whatother potential investors are bidding for the offering during the courseof an auction.

Preferably, an Auction Advisor provides a system upon which the auctionportion of the offering is run and assist the issuer of the securitiesin marketing the offering and running the auction. As shown in step 110of FIG. 1, which is a flow chart showing an overview of a securitiespricing and allocation system in accordance with a preferred embodimentof the present invention, prior to an auction, an issuer communicates amandate to the auction advisor that the issuer wishes to conduct a bondoffering using a pricing and allocation system in accordance with thepresent invention. Then, as shown in step 112, the issuer enters into anagreement with the auction advisor to price and sell the issuer'soffering. Preferably, this agreement is legally binding on the issuercontingent only on completion of a successful auction.

Because a binding agreement has been entered into, as shown in step 113,the issuer and/or auction advisor are able to determine a number ofauction parameters, discussed in detail below, preferably includingparameters which limit the price and total size of the offering. Theseauction parameters are preferably publicized to potential auctionparticipants.

In a securities distribution system in accordance with the presentinvention, bidder's can preferably place two types of bids, acompetitive bid and a non-competitive bid. As explained below in detail,bids include both a price component and a quantity component.Non-competitive bids are given in terms of the dollar amount ofsecurities desired by the bidder and are automatically assigned a pricecomponent equal to a minimum yield for the offering as set by theauction parameters Competitive bids preferably have both a quantitycomponent and a price component chosen by the bidder which may be abovea minimum yield as set by the auction parameters. Additionally,competitive bids preferably have a private component, used for pricingand allocation, and a public component, which is preferably madeavailable to other bidders while an auction is in progress and which ispreferably related to the private component. By having a public andprivate component, competitive bids can be used to provide bidders andissuers with information about the market value of an offering withoutrequiring the bidder to reveal exactly what his or her bid is. Finally,as shown in step 116, the auction is closed and, as explained below,preferably 30 minutes after the close of the auction final pricing iscompleted.

Next, as shown in step 118, a pricing and allocation auction isconducted by the auction advisor. Basically, a clearing price isdetermined by arranging bids received during the auction in order frombest to worst and pricing the offering at the bid price at which all thebonds offered can be allocated. Bonds are then allocated to all biddersbidding inclusively between the best bid price and the clearing price.Preferably, pricing achieved at this stage is set relative to the yieldof a benchmark Treasury bond at a time after the auction has ended.

A securities distribution system in accordance with the presentinvention provides a number of significant advantages over a traditionalfixed income securities offering. First, because issuers preferablyenter into an agreement to sell bonds before pricing or allocation ofbonds occurs, investors are provided with a relatively higher degree ofcertainty that bonds will be issued.

Also, far more information can, and preferably is, made available toinvestors prior to a showing of interest by investors than in pastsecurities distribution systems. Pricing and deal size information ismade available via the auction parameters publicized prior to theauction. Additionally, further “real-time” pricing information is madeavailable to potential investors during an auction by publicizing thepublic component of all bids as they become available. Both of thesefeatures of a preferred embodiment of the present inventionadvantageously disseminate important information to investors allowinginvestment decisions based on a higher degree of certainty.

The auction system also can provide greater exposure to the retailmarket as individual investors preferably have the ability to bid onofferings on substantially equal footing with institutional investors.Thus, individual retail investors can gain access to new fixed incomeofferings, including high-grade corporate bond offerings, whereas theymay not have had such access under previous security distributionschemes. The ability for retail investors to bid along sideinstitutional investors may have the additional effect of increasingdemand over that of a typical underwritten offering where the retailmarket is largely ignored relative to institutional buyers.

Additionally, the issuer of the securities does not have to pay as muchof a premium to an investment bank or other broker for selling thesecurities because if the inherent efficiencies of the electronicsystem. This can advantageously result in substantial savings to theissuer in making a security offering.

The auction system provides greater certainty that the allocation ofsecurities are awarded to those that desire them the most. Allocation isbased on the aggressiveness of an investor's bid and their time stamp.The higher the price an investor is willing to pay for a security andthe earlier they place their bid, the more likely they are to be awardedsecurities.

In a preferred embodiment, offerings utilizing an auction in accordancewith the present invention will be conducted through the use of asoftware system developed by the assignee, W. R. Hambrecht, Inc., whichis described in more detail below. This system will handle multipleaspects of the offering process, including subscription, pricing andallocation. It is to be understood, however, that a securities pricingand allocation system in accordance with the present invention my beachieved by any number of similar web-based software and hardwaremodules.

Although, as noted above, the pricing and distribution system of thepresent invention can be applied to any type of security, a preferredembodiment, discussed below, will be described with respect to bonds or,more specifically, corporate bonds. Additionally, pricing for bondsherein will be referred to in terms of interest rate paid on the bond oryield. Specifically, pricing will be referred to with respect to theinterest rate paid on the auctioned bonds relative to the interest ratepaid on a selected benchmark treasury bond. This quantity will bereferred to herein as the “spread.” It is to be noted that the lower thespread, the lower the interest rate the issuer must pay on the bond.Consequentially, the lower the spread of a given bid, the moreattractive it is to the issuer.

Subscription

In a system in accordance with the present invention, investment vehicleofferings are preferably accessible to both institutional and retailinvestors. In order to participate in any given offering investors mustbe registered with a designated Underwriter. It is expected thatinstitutional investors will be able to register directly with suchUnderwriter, but that retail investors will typically participate viaon-line brokerage firms. On the day the bonds become available for saleby the issuing company registered investors can submit bids on theoffering. Preferably, bids are submitted electronically through aweb-based interface maintained by the Assignee, W. R. Hambrecht Inc., asthe Auction Advisor. As discussed in detail below, any investor making abid will indicate the number of bonds such investor would be willing topurchase (“Bid Quantity”) and the spread the investor would be willingto accept (“Spread”).

Set-Up

Preferably, to arrange an offering, an issuer of securities contacts theauction advisor at least a week prior to the date the issuer would liketo sell the bonds and arranges to have the auction advisor offer andsell the bond issue through the auction process of the presentinvention.

Prior to conducting an auction, an issuer and/or the auction advisordetermine a number of auction parameters, listed below. Then,preferably, these parameters are announced to potential bidders prior tothe start of the auction. This feature advantageously provides apotential investor with far more information about a bond offering thanwas traditionally available through the previously used bond salestechniques discussed in the Background section.

The parameters listed below are those which are determined in apreferred embodiment. It is to be understood that it is within the ambitof the present invention to include either greater or fewer auctionparameters to be decided prior to the auction and announced to potentialbidders.

-   -   1. A minimum and maximum dollar amount of bonds to be issued        (“the Minimum and Maximum deal size”). This provides a potential        investor with concrete information concerning the total size of        an offering prior to bidding. The precise dollar amount of bonds        to be issued is preferably set midway between the start and        finish of an auction (which preferably would have a duration of        from 1 to 4 hours) and will be between the Minimum and Maximum        deal size. As discussed in detail below, by the midpoint of an        auction a substantial amount of pricing and demand information        will preferably have been collected by the auction advisor and        disseminated to both the issuer and the bidders. Thus, the        issuer is advantageously provided with valuable pricing and        demand information which can be used in determining a final        dollar amount of the offering.    -   2. A reference Treasury security of comparable maturity to bonds        being issued (the “Benchmark Treasury”). Bids are expressed in        terms of a yield above the yield of the Benchmark Treasury, or        the spread. As discussed below, the auction process determines a        spread at which the offered bonds will be sold (the “clearing        spread”). The final yield, however, is based on the yield of the        Benchmark Treasury, which can continue to fluctuate after a        clearing spread has been determined. The final yield is        preferably set based on the yield of the Benchmark Treasury 30        minutes after the close of the auction.    -   3. A minimum and a maximum differential over the Benchmark        Treasury for which bids will be accepted (the “Minimum Spread”        and the “Maximum Spread,” respectively). Providing this        information prior to the beginning of an auction gives potential        investors an idea of the range for the final yield of the        offered bonds (depending on the yield of the Benchmark Treasury        30 minutes after the close of the auction). Thus, potential        investors can gauge their interest in an offering and size and        price their bids accordingly.    -   4. A maximum yield for the Benchmark Treasury (the “Maximum        Benchmark Treasury Rate”). This indicates a maximum yield of the        Benchmark Treasury. The issuer and/or the auction sponsor has        the right, but not the obligation, to cancel an auction if the        actual treasury rate is greater than the Maximum Benchmark        Treasury Rate.    -   5. A minimum dollar size for competitive bids and        non-competitive bids. This is the lowest dollar amount a bidder        can bid in either a competitive bid or a non-competitive bid.        These parameters are set to prevent a proliferation of        undersized bids which could add unnecessary administrative        complexity to an auction. Additionally, an individual investor        may use these parameters to determine whether he or she wishes        to participate in the auction at all. The minimum dollar size        for competitive bids may, but need not, equal the minimum dollar        size for non-competitive bids.    -   6. A minimum dollar increment for competitive bids and        non-competitive bids. Bids must be made in these predetermined        increments. For example, if the minimum dollar increment is        $1000.00, bids must be in this increment. That is, no bids of,        for example, $10,500 would be accepted. These parameters are set        to mitigate administrative difficulties. The minimum dollar        increment for competitive bids may be, but does not need to be,        the same as the minimum dollar increment for non-competitive        bids.    -   7. A maximum dollar bid quantity (the “Maximum Bid Size”). This        is the maximum dollar amount that any single bidder can bid        after combining the bidder's competitive bid and non-competitive        bid. This parameter is set to prevent any single bidder from        having a dominating influence on the spread set by the auction.        Setting this parameter, then, can allow the clearing spread to        better reflect a true market valuation of the offered bonds.    -   8. A maximum spread under an Initial Bid that potential        investors can modify a Final Bid without canceling their        competitive bid (“the Protected Spread Range”). As discussed in        greater detail below, a competitive bid has a public spread        component and a private spread component. The Protected Spread        Range is the maximum amount, expressed in terms of basis points,        which the private spread component can be below the public        spread component without requiring cancellation and re-entry of        the entire competitive bid. For example, if a Protected Spread        Range is set at 0.04 (expressed in basis points) and a potential        investors competitive initial (public) bid is 0.75, then the        final (private) bid cannot be below 0.71 without canceling and        re-entering the competitive bid. As discussed below, the        protected spread range tends to cause the pricing information        provided publicly during an auction to reflect the private bid        information upon which the final pricing of the offering will be        based.    -   9. A maturity date for the issue.    -   10. A coupon frequency for the issue.    -   11. An auction starting and ending time. As noted above, auction        duration is preferably between 1 and 4 hours.    -   12. A time when the final deal size will be announced. As        discussed above, this time is preferably during the progress of        an auction.

By publicizing the auction parameters listed above prior to the start ofan auction, potential investors can receive far more information about afixed income offering than was typically made available in past offeringtechniques. In particular, through publication of the Minimum andMaximum Deal Size, the Benchmark Treasury and the Minimum and MaximumSpread, potential investors will receive information about both the sizeand pricing of a bond offering prior to the sale of the bonds. Thisinformation can advantageously be used by investors to make relativelymore certain investment decisions.

Auction Process

FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a preferred embodiment of the majorprocesses which take place during the auction portion of a system inaccordance with the present invention. As shown in step 150, the auctionbegins at a predetermined and published time. During the auction, thereare three major processes which take place. As shown in step 152, theauction advisor monitors the progress of the auction. In a preferredembodiment, this includes, for example, activities such as allowing onlyone competitive bid and one non-competitive bid per auction participant,monitoring the Benchmark Treasury Rate to see if it exceeds the MaximumTreasury Rate, and policing the authenticity of placed bids.

Additionally, as shown in step 154, and as explained in detail below,bids are taken by the auction advisor and the public component of thebids are publicized. It is to be understood that preferably, bids takenduring an auction are not necessarily accepted. That is, simply becausethe auction advisor takes a bid from a bidder, it does not necessarilymean that the bidder will receive bonds. As discussed below, onlysuccessful bidders will receive bonds.

As shown in step 156, the deal size is set, preferably midway throughthe auction. At a predetermined ending time, as shown in step 158, theauction is ended and no more bids are taken.

Bidding

Preferably, a pricing and allocation system in accordance with thepresent invention determines the yield which the bonds being offeredwill generate based on bids received by potential investors. Anpotential investor's auction bid preferably indicates two things: thenumber of bonds the potential investor wishes to purchase and the yieldthe potential investor wishes to receive for the bonds. The number ofbonds is preferably expressed as the total value of the bonds thepotential investor wishes to buy, for example, an investor mightindicate a desire to purchase $200,000 worth of bonds. The yield thepotential investor would like to receive on the purchased bonds ispreferably indicated in terms of spread between the yield of theBenchmark Treasury at the time of final pricing and the desired yield ofbonds being bid for in one basis point increments. For example, if theBenchmark Treasury has a yield of 7%, the auction participant would bid1.5% to indicate a willingness to accept an 8.5% yield on the purchasedbonds.

As discussed in detail below, in an bond pricing and distribution methodin accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention,whether a bid is successful depends generally on two factors: the sizeof the bid spread and the relative time at which the bid was placed.Generally, the lower the bid spread and the relatively earlier the bidis placed, the more likely the auction participant will receive the fullamount of bonds desired. Preferably, in order to determine when a bidwas placed, a “time stamp” is associated with the bid which indicateswhen a bid was received relative to other bids received during anauction.

As mentioned above, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention,there are two general categories of bids which an auction participantcan place: competitive bids and non-competitive bids. Competitive bidspreferably indicate both a quantity and a spread which can be above theMinimum Spread set by the issuer prior to the auction. Non-competitivebids, on the other hand, simply express a total amount of bonds whichthe bidder desires at the whatever the clearing price will be.

Additionally, there are two categories of competitive bids: publiccompetitive bids and private competitive bids. When first entering acompetitive a bid, a bidder preferably enters both a public competitivebid, or “initial bid,” and a private competitive bid, or “final bid.”The initial bid will not be part of a firm offer from the potentialinvestor at the time of the auction close, however, the final bid willbe part of such a firm offer. Additionally, the spread and quantity ofthe initial bid is made available to other potential investors while theauction is taking place (though the identity of the bidder is preferablynot revealed). Preferably, if the bidder does not enter a final bid atthe time of entering the initial bid, the initial bid becomes the finalbid by default.

Because the final bids affect the clearing spread of the offering, andbecome the potential investor's firm offer at the time of the close ofthe auction, in order to provide an indication to auction participantsof the market value of the offering, it might be desirable to publicizethe final bids. However, it may also be desirable to auctionparticipants to keep precise information about their firm offers privateuntil the end of the auction. Accordingly, to provide all bidders withsome indication of the market value of the offering, the private, finalbids are preferably related to the public, initial bids.

To achieve this, in a preferred embodiment, the issuer sets a ProtectedSpread Range which indicates the maximum amount a bidder's final bid canbe below his or her initial bid from the final bid spread withoutaltering the time stamp of the bid. For example, if an issuer set aprotected spread range of 0.35 basis points, a bidder's final bid spreadcould not be more that 0.35 below the bidders initial bid without losingthe time stamp of the bid. Preferably, if the bidder goes out of theprotected spread range, the original time stamp for the bid is lost anda new time stamp corresponding to the time the final bid outside theprotected spread range was made is assigned to the new bid.Additionally, a new initial bid is preferably created by default tomatch the final bid which is outside the protected spread range of theoriginal initial bid. Preferably, the final bid is not allowed to beabove the initial indication. This provides bidders viewing publiclyprovided bid information with the knowledge that the informationprovided reflects the largest spreads that other bidders are bidding.This can provide greater certainty for bidders viewing publicly providedbid information.

As noted above and explained in detail below, bonds are preferablyallocated partially based on the time stamp corresponding to the bid.Thus, in a competitive auction, it is to a bidder's benefit to both bidearly and retain the time stamp of his or her bid by not placing a finalbid outside the protected spread range. This provides a motivation forbidders to make final bids which are inside the protected spread rangewith respect to the bidder's initial bid. This, in turn, provides amotivation for bidders to make their initial bids reflect the bidder'sgenuine beliefs about the market value of the offering. Thus,advantageously, there is impetus to make publicly provided bidinformation available relatively early in the auction process and bearsome relationship to the true market value of the bond offering.

As mentioned above, bidders can also place non-competitive bids insteadof or in addition to competitive bids. In a Non-competitive bids thebidder enters a bid for the amount of bonds desired, such as $200,000.For pricing purposes, the spread component is set at the Minimum Spreadas determined by the issuer prior to the auction. As will be explainedin detail below, this means that non-competitive bids are the first bids“filled” or allocated the requested quantity of bonds. In this way, abidder who wants a certain amount of the offered bonds, but is nothighly concerned about the yield, can simply indicate how many bonds heor she desires and the bid will likely be filled at clearing spread.Also, preferably, retail investors are limited to submitting onlynon-competitive bids while institutional investors can submit eithercompetitive or non-competitive bids. This advantageously allows savvy,institutional investors to retain substantial control over the finalprice of the bonds thereby reducing the possible irrationality which maybe introduced into the market if retail investors were substantiallyimpacting the price of bonds. Like competitive bids, non-competitivebids also receive a time stamp when placed which may be used todetermine allocation priority.

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating a preferred embodiment for placingan initial bid in accordance with the present invention. At step 200, aninvestor places an initial bid. As shown in steps 210 and 216, theinvestor will have to enter quantity and, if the bid is competitive,will also have to enter a spread. After entering a quantity in step 210,as shown in steps 212 and 214, two checks are performed by the system.First, in step 212, it is determined whether the bid quantity is greaterthan the minimum bid size and in the correct bid increment. If eitherone or both of these conditions is not met, the investor is returned tostep 210 and asked to enter another bid quantity. If both of theseconditions are met then, in step 214, the system checks to be sure thatthe entered quantity is less than or equal to the investor's creditlimit or the maximum bid size. If the entered quantity is not less thanor equal to either one or both of these parameters than the invest or isasked to reenter the bid quantity. If the quantity is less than or equalto the investors credit limit and the maximum bid size, then thequantity component of the bidder's initial bid is approved.

As shown in step 216 a spread is also associated with the initial bid.In step 218, the system first determines whether the bid is competitiveor not. If the bid is not competitive then, in step 222 the spread forthe bid is set equal to the minimum bid spread. If the initial bid ispart of a competitive bid then a shown in step 220, it is determinedwhether the spread is below the maximum spread and above the minimumspread. If the spread is outside this minimal/maximum spread range, thebidder is returned to step 216 and asked to enter another spread. If thespread is within the minimum/maximum spread range, then the spreadcomponent of the bid is approved. Finally in step 224, if both thequantity component and the spread component of the initial bid areapproved, the bid is displayed to the public and given a time stamp.

As discussed above, it is possible to modify the spread component of acompetitive bid. Additionally, it is possible to modify the quantitycomponent of either a competitive bid or a non-competitive bid. FIG. 4is a flowchart illustrating how a system in accordance with the presentinvention allows a bidder to modify the quantity component of either acompetitive bid or a non-competitive bid and enter and modify a finalbid (of a competitive bid). At step 300, an investor modifies thequantity component of either competitive bid or non-competitive bid. Atstep 310, the system checks whether the modification is greater than theminimum bid size and in the correct bid increment. If the modified bidviolates either parameter, then the bidder is returned to step 300 andasked to enter a new modification. If both parameters are satisfied,then, in step 312, the system checks whether the modified bid quantitycomponent is greater or equal to the current bid quantity component.Thus, if the new quantity component is less than the original quantitycomponent, as shown in step 316, the bidder is asked whether he or shewould like to place a new bid, that is, a bid having a new time stamp.

If the bidder does not wish to lose the time stamp of the original bid,he or she is returned to step 300 to make an appropriate bidmodification. If the bidder does wish to enter a new bid he may do sobut only up to the pegged amount.

Changing a bid quantity by a relatively large amount, e.g. more than50%, can have a relatively large effect on the bid information that isprovided to bidders during the auction. Thus, allowing such largechanges is bid quantity could introduce greater uncertainty into theauction process. Accordingly, bidders are preferably discouraged fromchanging their bid quantities by such a large amount. Preferably, if abidder changes his or her original bid quantity by 50% or more, theoriginal bid is cancelled and the bidder must enter a new bid with a newtime stamp. Therefore, if the new quantity component of the modified bidis greater than or equal to the current bid quantity component then, atstep 314, the system checks whether the new quantity is less than 50%more than the original quantity component. If so, then, at step 316, thebidder is asked whether he or she would like to enter a new bid.However, if the new quantity component is less than 50% more than theoriginal quantity component, the change is accepted, the time stamp ispreserved and, as shown in step 318, the new quantity component isdisplayed to other bidders.

As discussed above, a competitive bid also has a final bid componentwhich is not made public during the auction. Referring again to FIG. 4,at step 400, a bidder enters or modifies the final bid component of acompetitive bid. As shown at step 400, the final bid component of acompetitive bid is set to the initial bid component by default. However,a bidder preferably is able enter a final bid which is different fromthe initial bid if the final bid is less than the initial bid and withinthe Protected Spread Range from the initial bid. Accordingly, as shownat step 410 the system checks whether the entered final bid is less thanthe initial bid by no more than the Protected Spread Range. If it isnot, at step 420, the bidder is given the opportunity to enter a newbid.

If the bidder does not wish to enter a new bid, the bidder is returnedto step 400. If the bidder does wish to enter a new bid, as shown instep 414, a new time stamp is assigned to the modified bid and theinitial bid component of the modified bid is by default set equal to thenew final bid component. If the bidder desires, however, an initial biddifferent from the new final bid can be entered as long as it is greaterthan the new final bid and within the protected spread range of thefinal bid. Returning to step 410, if the new final bid entered at 400 isless than the original initial bid by no more than the Protected SpreadRange, then at step 416, the new final bid is accepted with no change inthe time stamp of the bid.

After accepting bids for a predetermined amount of time, as set in theauction parameters, the auction is closed and no additional bids areaccepted and submitted bids cannot be changed.

Pricing and Allocation

The final yield which investors will receive for bonds sold through theauction process is preferably determined following the auction close.Most preferably, the final yield is determined 30 minutes after theauction close. Immediately after auction close, however, a spread atwhich the offered bonds will be sold relative to the Benchmark TreasuryRate, or clearing spread, is determined. FIG. 5 is a flow chart showingthe process which is used to price and allocate bonds in the offering.

As shown at step 500, non-competitive bids and final bid components ofcompetitive bids are arranged in an array from lowest spread to highestspread. As noted above, non-competitive bids are automatically assignedthe Minimum Spread as determined in the auction parameters. Accordingly,non-competitive bids will be collected at the lowest level of the arrayof arranged bids. Bids having the same spread are arranged in the arrayin ascending order from the earliest time stamp to the latest timestamp. Bids having the same time stamp and spread are placed at the samelevel in the array.

As shown in steps 501 and 510, the lowest bid or bids (if multiple bidsshare the same time stamp) are “accepted.” Subject to there beingsufficient quantity demand to fill the deal size, bidders of acceptedbids will receive bonds at the clearing spread. Then, in step 512, thesystem checks whether the aggregate quantity of accepted bids equals orexceeds the deal size. If not 511, then the next highest bid or bids inthe array are accepted. The system loops through steps 510 and 512 untilthe aggregate quantity of accepted bids is equal to or greater than thedeal size 513. Then, as shown in step 514, the system checks whether allof the accepted bids are non-competitive bids. If not 515, that is, ifthere is at least one competitive bid accepted, then as shown in step516, the clearing spread is set equal to the spread of the last acceptedbid or bids (having the same spread and time stamp).

If all of the accepted bids are non-competitive 517 then, as shown instep 518, the clearing spread is set at either one of two values. If theaggregate dollar quantity of bonds requested by the accepted bidsexactly equals the deal size, bonds will be awarded at the mid-pointbetween the Minimum Spread and the Maximum Spread. If, however, theaggregate quantity of bonds requested by the accepted bids is greaterthan the deal size, bonds will be awarded at the Minimum Spread.

As shown in step 520, if there are multiple bids with the same timestamp and which spread component equals the clearing spread, then bondsare allocated among these bids on a pro-rate basis. Then, in step 522,the system determines whether the aggregate quantity component of theaccepted bids is greater than the deal size. If it is not 523, that is,if the aggregate quantity component of the accepted bids is equal to thedeal size, then, as shown in steps 524 and 526, investors are awardedbonds at the clearing spread according to the quantity component bid.

As shown in step 528, if the aggregate quantity component of theaccepted bids is greater than the deal size, the accepted bids with thehighest spread and the latest time stamp will be awarded only a portionof desired quantity indicated by the bid. The portion awarded ispreferably equal to the difference between the deal size and theaggregate quantity of bonds requested by all accepted bids minus thequantity of bonds requested by the accepted bid with the highest bid andthe latest time stamp. Additionally, as shown in step 526, bonds will beawarded at the clearing spread.

Closing

Bond pricing occurs approximately 30 minutes after an auctionterminates. The auction yield is preferably determined by adding theclearing spread to the Benchmark Treasury Rate. The coupon rate on thebond will be set at the auction yield rounded down to an incrementdetermined by the issuer and auction advisor. The bond price thatcorresponds to the auction yield and coupon rate is preferably roundedto three decimal places.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

While the following description of the preferred embodiment articulatesthe current operating rules in terms of an auction and system focused onbond or debt securities it will be clear to those skilled in these artsthat these and similar rules can be used in and for similar electronicauctions of securities of any kinds as well as for similar auctions ofmost commodities. Similarly, while the description of the systemshardware and software and their current architecture are used at presentfor auctions of bonds and other debt securities, it will be clear tothose skilled in these arts that these and similar hardware and softwaremeans can be used in and for similar electronic auctions of securitiesof any kinds as well as for similar auctions of most commodities.

Technology Employed

The OpenBook auction system builds on the design and architecturedeveloped for W. R. Hambrecht's proprietary OpenIPO™ equity underwritingplatform. This is described in the related pending application Ser. No.09/347,949 filed Jul. 6, 1999 which is incorporated fully herein byreference. The auction engine employs a modular, client-serverarchitecture that can be partitioned across several processors usingstandard network protocols. The core of the system is the OrderManagement Server (OMS) which utilizes a commercial, off-the-shelfrelational database to provide transaction-oriented persistent storage.Other components of the system interact with the OMS via a distributedmessaging system to handle administration, bid management, andsecurities allocation. The novelty of the present invention includingits differences from this prior invention will be described in moredetail below.

Current Operating Rules

In the preferred embodiment of the system, the following rules governthe participation of buyers and sellers of securities and are consistentwith current Federal and State Regulations governing the sale of suchsecurities.

1. General Terms

-   -   1.1. These rules (the “Rules”) shall govern the participation by        prospective purchasers of securities (the “Investor(s)”) in the        OpenBook system Internet electronic auction system (the “System”        or “the OpenBook system”) operated by W R Hambrecht+Co. (“WRH”).        Each Investor by signing a Customer Agreement and/or        Participation Agreement with WRH, an underwriter or dealer        participating in the OpenBook system agrees to be bound by the        Rules and to consent to the participation of other Investors in        the OpenBook system. These rules should not be interpreted in        connection with any other document (including documents posted        on the WRH web site) except the Customer Agreement, The OpenBook        System Participation Agreement and any amendments to this        document specifically labeled as such.    -   1.2. WRH has the exclusive right to amend the Rules from time to        time and will post such amendments on the OpenBook system.        Investors will be bound by an amendment after the effective date        set forth in the amendment.    -   1.3. WRH has the right to cancel any auction if in its sole        discretion events have occurred that would interfere with the        operation of such auction.        2. The Issuer    -   2.1. An issuer of securities (“the Issuer”) and/or WRH selects        the following terms that will be announced on the OpenBook        system prior to an auction: a minimum and maximum dollar amount        of bonds to be issued; a reference Treasury security of        approximately comparable maturity to bonds being issued (the        “Benchmark Treasury”); a minimum differential (a “Spread”) over        the Benchmark Treasury for which bids will be accepted (the        “Minimum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury”); a maximum        differential over the Benchmark Treasury for which bids will be        accepted (the “Maximum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury”); a        maximum rate for the Benchmark Treasury (a “Maximum Benchmark        Treasury Rate”); a minimum dollar size for Competitive Bids (the        “Minimum Competitive Bid Size”); a minimum dollar increment for        Competitive Bids (the “Minimum Competitive Bid Increment”); a        minimum dollar size for Non-Competitive Bids (a “Minimum        Non-Competitive Bid Size”); a minimum dollar increment for        Non-Competitive Bids (the “Minimum Non-Competitive Bid        Increment”); a maximum dollar bid quantity (the “Maximum Bid        Size”); a maximum Spread under an Initial Bid that Investors can        modify a Final Bid without canceling their Competitive Bid (the        “Protected Spread Range”); a maturity date for the issue; a        coupon frequency for the issue; an auction starting time; an        auction ending time; and a time that the Deal Size will be        announced. An Issuer and/or WRH may select any additional terms        deemed relevant to an auction.    -   2.2. The Issuer and/or WRH has the right, but not the obligation        to cancel an auction on the OpenBook system if the actual        treasury rate is greater that the Maximum Benchmark Treasury        Rate.    -   2.3. The Issuer and/or WRH will announce the exact dollar size        of an issue (the “Deal Size”) at some pre-specified point during        an auction.        3. Bidding    -   3.1. The auction will start and end at times determined by the        Issuer and/or WRH. Investors may not place bids prior to the        start or after the end of the auction.    -   3.2. Investors may enter a desired quantity of bonds in dollars        and two Spreads over the Benchmark Treasury, in one basis point        increments (collectively a “Competitive Bid”).        -   3.2.1. When an Investor enters a Competitive Bid, the first            Spread component will be revealed to other Investors on the            OpenBook system, but the identity of the Investor will            remain anonymous (an “Initial Bid”).        -   3.2.2. The second Spread component will not be revealed to            other Investors until after the auction ends (the “Final            Bid”). The Final Bid may not be less than the Initial Bid by            more than the Protected Spread Range.        -   3.2.3. The Initial Bid will not be part of a firm offer on            the part of the Investor at the time of the auction close.            The Final Bid and quantity component of a Competitive Bid            will comprise a firm offer on the part of the Investor at            the time of the auction close.    -   3.3. In addition to or in place of a Competitive Bid, Investors        may enter a desired quantity of bonds in dollars and a Spread        equal to the Minimum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury        (collectively a “Non-Competitive Bid”).    -   3.4. New Competitive Bids and new Non-Competitive Bids will be        marked in one minute increments at the time a confirmation of a        bid is received by the OpenBook system (the “Time Stamp”).    -   3.5. Investors may place only one Competitive Bid and one        Non-Competitive Bid at any time.    -   3.6. The quantity component of a Competitive Bid must be greater        than or equal to the Minimum Competitive Bid Size and in an        increment evenly divisible by the Minimum Competitive Bid        Increment. The quantity component of a Non-Competitive Bid must        be greater than or equal to the Minimum Non-Competitive Bid Size        and in an increment evenly divisible by the Minimum        Non-Competitive Bid Increment.    -   3.7. When added together, the quantity components of a        Competitive Bid and a Non-Competitive Bid must not exceed the        lesser of an Investor's credit limit as set by WRH or the        Maximum Bid Size.    -   3.8. An Initial Bid and a Final Bid must be greater than or        equal to the Minimum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury and less        than or equal to the Maximum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury.        4. Changing Bid Spreads    -   4.1. Investors may change a Final Bid at any time during the        auction. A Final Bid must be less than or equal to the current        Initial Bid.    -   4.2. If an investor attempts to change a Final Bid to a value        that is less than the Initial Bid by more than the Protected        Spread Range (a “Disqualified Final Bid”), the OpenBook system        will automatically offer the Investor the opportunity to enter a        new Competitive Bid with the following values set by default but        subject to change by the Investor: a quantity component equal to        the quantity component of the previous Competitive Bid and an        Initial Bid and Final Bid equal to the Disqualified Final Bid.    -   4.3. Investors cannot modify the Spread component of a        Non-Competitive bid.        5. Changing Bid Quantities    -   5.1. Investors may change the quantity component of a        Competitive Bid or Non-Competitive Bid at any time during an        auction.    -   5.2. If an Investor attempts to change the quantity component of        a Competitive Bid to a value (the “Competitive Bid Disqualified        Quantity Component”) that is (1) less than the currently        existing quantity component of that Competitive Bid or (2) that        is greater than 50% more than the first quantity component that        an Investor entered for that Competitive Bid, the OpenBook        system will automatically offer the Investor the opportunity to        enter a new Competitive Bid with the following values set by        default but subject to change by the Investor: a quantity        component equal to the Competitive Bid Disqualified Quantity        Component and an Initial Bid and Final Bid equal to the Initial        Bid and Final Bid components of the previous Competitive Bid.    -   5.3. If an Investor attempts to change the quantity component of        a Non-Competitive Bid to a value (the “Non-Competitive Bid        Disqualified Quantity Component”) that is (1) less than the        currently existing quantity component of that Non-Competitive        Bid or (2) that is greater than 50% more than the first quantity        component that an Investor entered for that Non-Competitive Bid,        the OpenBook system will automatically offer the Investor the        opportunity to enter a new Non-Competitive Bid with the        following values set by default but subject to change by the        Investor: a quantity component equal to the Non-Competitive Bid        Disqualified Bid Quantity Component and a Spread component equal        to the Minimum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury.        6. Award of Bonds    -   6.1. If the total quantity of bonds requested by all Competitive        and Non-Competitive bids is less than the Deal Size, WRH has the        right, but not the obligation to cancel the auction and reject        all submitted bids. If the total quantity of bonds requested by        all Competitive and Non-Competitive bids is less than the Deal        Size and WRH decides not to cancel the auction, the underwriting        syndicate will place a Non-Competitive Bid with a quantity        component equal to the difference between the Deal Size and the        total quantity of bonds requested by all Competitive and        Non-Competitive bids.    -   6.2. At the end of an auction, Competitive and Non-Competitive        Bids will be arranged from the lowest to the highest Final Bid        or Spread component of a Non-Competitive Bid. Except as modified        by Sections 6.3-6.5, Competitive Bids and Non-Competitive Bids        will be accepted starting with the lowest Final Bid or the        lowest Spread component of a Non-Competitive Bid until the        aggregate quantity of bonds requested by the accepted bids is        greater than or equal to the Deal Size. The lowest Spread level        that results in the total quantity of bonds requested being        greater than or equal to the Deal Size is called the “Clearing        Spread”.    -   6.3. All Competitive Bids that have a Final Bid component or        Non-Competitive Bids that have a Spread component that equals        the Clearing Spread will be arranged from earliest to latest        Time Stamp. Except as modified by Sections 6.4 and 6.5,        Competitive Bids and Non-Competitive Bids will be accepted        starting with the earliest Time Stamp until the aggregate        quantity of bonds requested by the accepted bids is greater than        or equal to the Deal Size. Bids that have the same Time Stamp        and that have a Spread component equal to the Clearing Spread        will be awarded bonds on a pro-rata basis according to dollar        quantity of bonds requested.    -   6.4. If all bids are Non-Competitive and the aggregate dollar        quantity of bonds requested by those bids exactly equals the        Deal Size, bonds will be awarded at the mid-point between the        Minimum Spread over the Benchmark Treasury and Maximum Spread        over the Benchmark Treasury. Except as modified by Section 6.5,        if all bids are Non-Competitive and the aggregate dollar        quantity of bonds requested by those bids is greater than the        Deal Size, bonds will be awarded at the Minimum Spread over the        Benchmark Treasury.    -   6.5. If the aggregate quantity of bonds requested by all        accepted bids is greater than the Deal Size, the accepted bids        with the highest Spread and the latest Time Stamp will be        awarded a partial quantity of bonds equal to the difference        between the Deal Size and the aggregate quantity of bonds        requested by all accepted bids minus the quantity of bonds        requested by the accepted bid with the highest Spread and the        latest Time Stamp.    -   6.6. All Investors that have a Final Bid or Spread component of        a Non-Competitive Bid less than the Clearing Spread will be        awarded bonds at the Clearing Spread.    -   6.7. W. R. Hambrecht reserves the right to reject a Competitive        or Non-Competitive bid for any reason.    -   6.8. A bid that is accepted by WRH will constitute an        irrevocable contract to purchase securities by the Investor.        7. Pricing    -   7.1. Bond pricing occurs approximately 30 minutes after an        auction terminates. The auction yield (the “Auction Yield”) is        determined by adding the Clearing Spread to the Benchmark        Treasury Rate. The coupon rate on the bond will be set at the        Auction Yield rounded down to an increment determined by WRH and        the Issuer. The bond price that corresponds to the Auction Yield        and coupon rate is rounded to three decimal places.

The Auction Process

In an embodiment of the invention, an overview of the system of thepresent invention is shown in FIG. 6. In an embodiment of the invention,an end user of the auction method and system of the present inventionuses a standard web browser 601 to access via a network, such as theInternet 602, both an information website 603 and the auction server604. The information website 603 may be associated to a published URLand contains information about offerings and the auction process of themethod and system of the present invention. The auction server 604 maycontain the auction engine itself, where the auctions are run.

FIG. 22 shows an exemplary embodiment of the physical network for themethod and system of the present invention. A router 2202, such as aCisco router is connected to a network, such as the Internet 2201. In anembodiment of the invention, an auction application of the method andsystem of the present invention is deployed at a co-location facilitythat provides a 100 Mbps connection to the Internet 2201. Router 2202 isconnected to switch 2203, which may be a 10 Mpbs/100 Mpbs switchassociated with a public network. Switch 2203 is connected to productionauction server 2204, which may be designated as the hot productionserver. Switch 2203 is also connected to backup server 2206, which maybe designated as a warm backup server. Production auction server 2204and backup server 2206 are connected to switch 2205, which may bedesignated a private network switch and may be associated with a privatenetwork. In an embodiment of the invention, digital streams to and fromthe Internet 2201 pass through router 2202 and then switch 2203, whichdirects auction-related bit traffic over the associated public networkto production auction server 2204. Backup server 2206 may also be on thesame associated public network and serves as the fail-over for theproduction auction server 2204. Switch 2205 serves as a connection tothe associated private network that contains other non-Internet relatedapplications.

FIG. 23 shows an overview of an embodiment of an auction server 2301 ofthe method and system of the present invention. Auction server 2301 maycontain one or more databases 2302, an OMS 2305, a bid manager 2306, anauctioneer 2303, and an administrator 2304. Auctioneer 2303,administrator 2304, and bid manager 2306 all have access to the OMS2305. In an embodiment of the invention, auctioneer 2303, administrator2304, and bid manager 2306 may have varying degrees of access to the OMS2305. OMS 2305 is an order management system that is associated with oneor more databases 2302. Bid manager 2306 is connected to web server2307, which is in turn connected to a network, such as the Internet2308.

FIG. 24 shows a more detailed view of an exemplary systems architecturefor the method and system of the present invention. Order ManagementSystem 2410, or OMS, as exemplified by an OMS/CoreOMS with the OpenBooksystem Extensions in an embodiment of the invention, is responsible fortracking the principal objects of the system, which may includeinformation associated with users, accounts, auctions, positions, andfills. Order Management System 2410 may implement user-basedauthentication and role-based authorization. In an embodiment of theinvention, Order Management System 2410 may also implement a JavaRMI-based API/SPI for client access and is the locus for timing andevents throughout the system. In an embodiment of the invention, OrderManagement System 2410 uses Relational Backing Store 2407 to locate andkeep the principal objects available in a persistent storage device. Inan embodiment of the invention, Relational Backing Store 2407 isresponsible for mapping the principal objects of the system onto arelational schema, locating and keeping the principal objects of theOpenBook system available in a persistent storage, and for obeyingreferential integrity constraints of the data model. In an embodiment ofthe invention, Relational Backing Store 2407 implements a Java JDBCinterface to the vendor Relational Database System 2408, such as theSybase Adaptive Server Enterprise.

In an embodiment of the invention, OpenBookManager 2406 is responsiblefor bidder account management, multiplexing a bidder-role basedinterface to the Order Management System 2410, and position managementfor authorized accounts and to provide a single listener interface forstate changes in active auctions. The OpenBookManager 2406 makes stateand position information available to clients for use by any userinterface system that does not use the Order Management System 2410API/SPI directly.

In an embodiment of the invention, the OpenBook system Servlet Interface2405 provides programmatic execution linkage between the Java ServletEngine 2404 API Specification and the OpenBookManager 2406 module.Servlet invocations are mapped to OpenBookManager 2406 interfaces toallow user interfaces to be constructed for HTML. The OpenBook ServletInterface 2405 is invoked and controlled by Java Servlet Engine 2404,which may be a 3^(rd) party Java Servlet Engine such as JRun fromAllaire. JRun is in turn utilized by the 3^(rd) party HTTP web server2402, which may be Zeus from Zeus Technology. HTTP web server 2402 is inturn connected to Web Browser User Interface 2401.

In an embodiment of the invention, HTML Templates 2403 are provided toallow for the separation of functionality between the OpenBook ServletInterface 2405 module and the HTML designer. Server Side Includetemplate mappings may be provided for the principal objects of thesystem and all their attributes, as well as system attributes such astime and date. Multiple browser products may be supported andaccommodated.

Auction Server Database Schema

In an embodiment of the invention, an exemplary database schema for anauction server of the method and system of the present invention willnow be described.

In an embodiment of the invention, an auctiondb database may representthe Relational Backing Store (RBS) 2407, as shown in FIG. 24. Thisdatabase is associated with the auction server of the method and systemof the present invention.

The following statements clean out any existing auction database to setup an auction:

use master dump transaction master with no_log drop database openbook go

The following creates an empty auction database:

create database openbook on data=10 log on logs=10 go use openbook go

A users table defines static information about entities that are allowedaccess to parts of the system. Referring to FIG. 23, a user may be anadministrator 2304, an auctioneer 2304, a bid manager 2306, an entity inan auditor role, or an entity that sets up accounts. The degree ofaccess to various components may be determined by the UserRoles table.Each user is assigned a unique UserID which is used to refer to the userfrom other tables. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..users (  tStamp datetime   not null,  ownerIdnumeric(18,0)   not null,  id numeric(18,0) not null,  userNamevarchar(60) not null,  contactName varchar(80)   null,  securityType intnot null,  securityKey varchar(255) null,  status int not null,  unique(id),  unique (userName) ) print “Created openbook..users” go

A userLog table relates to security and error checking for users in themethod and system of the present invention. Whenever an action is taken,the userlog is updated to catalog the action. An embodiment is asfollows:

create table openbook..userLog (  editId numeric(18,0) not null  references openbook..users(id),  txId numeric(18,0) not null,  actionint not null,  tStamp datetime   not null,  ownerId numeric(18,0)   notnull,  id numeric(18,0) not null references openbook..users (id), userName varchar(60) not null,  contactName varchar(80)   null, securityType int not null,  securityKey varchar(255) null,  status intnot null,  unique (txId) ) print “Created openbook..userLog” go

An accounts table is used to record information associated with endusers, such as investors associated with the method and system of thepresent invention. Examples of end users are institutional buyers,individual investors, and retail users. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..accounts (   tStamp datetime not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0) not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null,   account varchar(80) not null,   namevarchar(60) not null,   status int not null,   securityKey varchar(60)null,   contactName varchar(80) null,   company varchar(60) null,  address1 varchar(60) null,   address2 varchar(60) null,   address3varchar(60) null,   city varchar(50) null,   state varchar(20) null,  zip varchar(20) null,   country varchar(50) null,   directPhonevarchar(30) null,   mobilePhone varchar(30) null,   faxNumbervarchar(30) null,   emailAddress varchar(80) null,   challengevarchar(80) null,   response varchar(80) null,   companySwitchboardvarchar(30) null,   wrhManager1 varchar(80) null,   wrhManager2varchar(80) null,   clearingAccount varchar(80) null,   instructionsvarchar(80) null,   accountManager varchar(80) null,  accountNameDisclosed bit not null,   accountType varchar(8) null,  bloomberg varchar(80) null,   bocName varchar(80) null,   bocPhonevarchar(30) null,   bocEmail varchar(80) null,   creditLimit float null,  agreementSigned datetime null,   unique (id),   unique (account) )print “Created openbook..accounts” go

An accountLog table is used to record and catalog all actions taken bygiven account. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..accountLog (   editId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..users(id),   txId numeric(18,0) not null,  action int not null,   tStamp datetime not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0) not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null references openbook..accounts (id),   accountvarchar(80) not null,   name varchar(60) not null,   status int notnull,   securityKey varchar(60) null,   contactName varchar(80) null,  company varchar(60) null,   address1 varchar(60) null,   address2varchar(60) null,   address3 varchar(60) null,   city varchar(50) null,  state varchar(20) null,   zip varchar(20) null,   country varchar(50)null,   directPhone varchar(30) null,   mobilePhone varchar(30) null,  faxNumber varchar(30) null,   emailAddress varchar(80) null,  challenge varchar(80) null,   response varchar(80) null,  companySwitchboard varchar(30) null,   wrhManager1 varchar(80) null,  wrhManager2 varchar(80) null,   clearingAccount varchar(80) null,  instructions varchar(80) null,   accountManager varchar(80) null,  accountNameDisclosed bit not null,   accountType varchar(8) null,  bloomberg varchar(80) null,   bocName varchar(80) null,   bocPhonevarchar(30) null,   bocEmail varchar(80) null,   creditLimit float null,  agreementSigned datetime null,   unique (txId) ) print “Createdopenbook..accountLog” go

A roles table provides a convenient repository for security rolesdefined by the auction system. Each role is assigned a unique RoleID.This RoleID is referred to by a UserRoles table. Semantics of roles aredefined by the application. The roles of users may be checked todetermine if a user has access to certain resources or is allowed toperform various tasks. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..roles (   roleId numeric(18,0) not null,  roleName varchar(20) not null,   unique (roleId),   unique (roleName)) print “Created openbook..roles” go

The userRoles table enumerates all of the roles that are associated witha particular user. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..userRoles (   userId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..users(id),   roleId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..roles(roleId) ) create unique indexuserRolesIndex on openbook..userRoles(userId, roleId) create indexuserRolesUserIndex on openbook..userRoles (userId) create indexuserRolesRolesIndex on openbook..userRoles (roleId) print “Createdopenbook..userRoles” go

In an embodiment of the invention, a userRoleLog table represents thecomplete transaction history of each role change for each user known tothe system. Each transaction is assigned a unique userRoleTxID. Anembodiment is as follows:

*/ create table openbook..userRoleLog (   userRoleTxId numeric(18,0)  not null,   editId numeric(18,0) not null    referencesopenbook..users(id),   userId numeric(18,0) not null    referencesopenbook..users(id),   roleId numeric(18,0) not null    referencesopenbook..roles(roleId),   action int not null ) print “Createdopenbook..userRoleLog” go

In an embodiment of the invention, view userRoleNames is associated withthe same data as userRoles but provides user and role names instead ofids. An embodiment is as follows:

*/ create view userRoleNames as   select userName, roleName   fromopenbook..userRoles ur, users u, roles r   where ur.userId = u.id andur.roleId = r.roleId print “Created openbook..userRoleNames” go

An auctions table defines actual auctions that are run. Each auction isassociated with a set of parameters defining that auction. Click-throughparameters may also be used. Table values for parameters may be stored.In an embodiment of the invention, parameters that are required and mustbe provided are the ones listed as “not null” in the following exemplaryembodiment:

create table openbook..auctions (   tStamp datetime not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0) not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null,   cusip varchar(12) not null,   descriptionvarchar(255) null,   status int not null,   totalAvailable int not null,  minValue float not null,   maxValue float not null,   valueIncrementfloat not null,   lotSize int not null,   openTime datetime not null,  closeTime datetime not null,   alert varchar(255) null,  announcedSize int not null,   minAuctionSize int not null,  maxAuctionSize int not null,   auctionFormat varchar(80) null,  benchmarkDesignationTime int not null,   benchmarkDollarPriceAtPricingfloat not null,   benchmarkRateAtPricing float not null,  benchmarkRateMax float not null,   benchmarkTreasury varchar(15) null,  benchmarkCusip varchar(12) null,   bondsFreeToTradeAt int not null,  clearingSpread float not null,   jointManagers varchar(80) null,  compSizeIncrement int not null,   couponDates varchar(100) null,  couponFrequency varchar(15) null,   couponRate float not null,  dollarPrice float not null,   evalInterval int not null,   faceValuefloat not null,   finalPricingTime int not null,   issuer varchar(50)null,   listed varchar(15) null,   maturity datetime null,  accruedInterest float not null,   maxBidIncrease float not null,  maxCompSize int not null,   maxNonCompSize int not null,   maxPurchasefloat not null,   minCompSize int not null,   minNonCompSize int notnull,   nonCompSizeIncrement int not null,   pricingTime int not null,  protectedSpread float not null,   rating varchar(40) null,  sellingConcession float not null,   settlementDate datetime null,  settlementTerms varchar(80) null,   issueDate datetime not null,  sizingTime int not null,   softDollarEarlyCutoff int not null,  softDollarEarlyPercent float not null,   softDollarLatePercent floatnot null,   structure varchar(80) null,   term int not null,  typeOfIssue varchar(30) null,   wrhManagerRole varchar(30) null,  yieldToMaturity float not null,   unique (id),   unique (cusip) )print “Created openbook..auctions” go

In an embodiment of the invention, ‘view deals’ allows users to seeviews for report generation and reporting purposes, such as for thosewho monitor an auction. Views may be created so that databases do nothave to be queried each time a report needs to be run. In an embodimentof the invention, data is already assembled and fed into reportingstructures associated with method and system of the present invention.An embodiment is as follows:

create view deals as   select tStamp, ownerId, id, cusip, description,status   from openbook..auctions print “Created view deals” go

An auctionLog table is used to catalog and record all actions taken fora particular auction. In an embodiment of the invention, user changesare recorded in the auctionLog table. In an embodiment of the invention,parameters may be changed by a user. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..auctionLog (   editId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..users(id),   txId numeric(18,0) not null,  action int not null,   tStamp datetime   not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0)   not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null references openbook..auctions (id),   cusipvarchar(12) not null,   description varchar(255) null,   status int notnull,   totalAvailable int not null,   minValue float   not null,  maxValue float   not null,   valueIncrement float not null,   lotSizeint not null,   openTime datetime not null,   closeTime datetime notnull,   alert varchar(255)   null,   announcedSize int   not null,  minAuctionSize int   not null,   maxAuctionSize int   not null,  auctionFormat varchar(80)   null,   benchmarkDesignationTime int    not null,   benchmarkDollarPriceAtPricing float     not null,  benchmarkRateAtPricing float     not null,   benchmarkRateMax float    not null,   benchmarkTreasury varchar(15)     null,   benchmarkCusipvarchar(12)   null,   bondsFreeToTradeAt int     not null,  clearingSpread float   not null,   jointManagers varchar(80)   null,  compSizeIncrement int     not null,   couponDates varchar(100)   null,  couponFrequency varchar(15)     null,   couponRate float   not null,  dollarPrice float   not null,   evalInterval int   not null,  faceValue float     not null,   finalPricingTime int   not null,  issuer varchar(50)   null,   listed varchar(15)   null,   maturitydatetime   null,   accruedInterest float   not null,   maxBidIncreasefloat   not null,   maxCompSize int     not null,   maxNonCompSize int  not null,   maxPurchase float   not null,   minCompSize int     notnull,   minNonCompSize int   not null,   nonCompSizeIncrement int   notnull,   pricingTime int     not null,   protectedSpread float   notnull,   rating varchar(40)   null,   sellingConcession float     notnull,   settlementDate datetime     null,   settlementTerms varchar(80)  null,   issueDate datetime   not null,   sizingTime int   not null,  softDollarEarlyCutoff int   not null,   softDollarEarlyPercent float  not null,   softDollarLatePercent float   not null,   structurevarchar(80)   null,   term int   not null,   typeOfIssue varchar(30)    null,   wrhManagerRole varchar(30)   null,   yieldToMaturity float  not null,   unique (txId) ) print “Created openbook..auctionLog” go

In an embodiment of the invention, view dealLog shows views for aparticular deal. View dealLog may be used for reporting or otherpurposes. An embodiment is as follows:

create view dealLog as   select editId, txId, action, tStamp, ownerId,id,    cusip, description, status   from openbook..auctionLog print“Created view dealLog” go

A positions table records the structures for bids, including suchobjects as sizes, timestamps, initial bid spreads, and final bidspreads. In an embodiment of the invention, for a non-competitive bid, asize and a timestamp is logged. In an embodiment of the invention, for acompetitive bid, a size, a final bid spread, an initial bid spread, anda timestamp are logged. In an embodiment of the invention, user accountsmay be referenced. The positions table may also index by account and/orby auction. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..positions (   tStamp datetime not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0) not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null,   dealId numeric(18,0) not null     referencesopenbook..auctions (id),   account varchar(80) not null,   size int notnull,   minFillSize int not null,   status int not null,   value floatnot null,   initialValue float not null,   nonCompSize int not null,  treasuries float null,   priority_tStamp datetime null,  priority_size int null,   nonCompPriority_tStamp datetime null,  nonCompPriority_size int null,   unique (id),   unique (account,dealId) ) print “Created openbook..positions” go

In an embodiment of the invention, table positionLog records changesthat are made to a positions table. In an embodiment of the invention,examples of changes are changes in spread, changes in size, and changesin timestamp. All actions for accounts may be logged. Table positionLogmay be indexed per auction, via unique auctionIDs for each auction,and/or cross-referenced with user IDs. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..positionLog (   editId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..users(id),   txId numeric(18,0) not null,  action int not null,   tStamp datetime not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0) not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null references openbook..positions (id),   dealIdnumeric(18,0) not null     references openbook..auctions (id),   accountvarchar(80) not null,   size int not null,   minFillSize int not null,  status int not null,   value float not null,   initialValue float notnull,   nonCompSize int not null,   treasuries float null,  priority_tStamp datetime null,   priority_size int null,  nonCompPriority_tStamp datetime null,   nonCompPriority_size int null,  unique (txId) ) print “Created openbook..positionLog” go

In an embodiment of the invention, a fills table may store informationabout bonds that are awarded. An end user may set up a position. The enduser may or may not get a fill, based on the other positions in theauction and other factors. An embodiment is as follows:

create table openbook..fills (   tStamp datetime   not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0)   not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null,   indicationId numeric(18,0)   not null   references openbook..positions (id),   value float   not null,   sizeint not null,   status int   not null,   softDollarAllocation float  not null,   unique (id) ) print “Created openbook..fills” go

In an embodiment of the invention, a fillLog table catalogs and recordschanges to fills. Examples of changes include changes made by anadministrator due to mistakes, suspect bids, and/or decisions to sell alesser quantity or otherwise modify bids. In an embodiment of theinvention, an administrator or other party may change bids.

create table openbook..fillLog (   editId numeric(18,0) not null   references openbook..users(id),   txId numeric(18,0) not null,  action int not null,   tStamp datetime   not null,   ownerIdnumeric(18,0)   not null    references openbook..users(id),   idnumeric(18,0) not null references openbook..fills (id),   indicationIdnumeric(18,0)   not null    references openbook..positions (id),   valuefloat   not null,   size int not null,   status int   not null,  softDollarAllocation float   not null,   unique (txId) ) print“Created openbook..fillLog” go create clustered index fillsBidIdIndex onopenbook..fills(id) go

An embodiment of a database schema dump or exit is as follows:

checkpoint go sp_dropdevice dbdumpfile go sp_addumpdevice “disk”,dbdumpfile, “/tmp/dbdump” go dump database openbook to dbdumpfile go_EOF_(—) /bin/rm -f /tmp/dbdump exit 0

In an embodiment of the invention, the method and system of the presentinvention is associated with a corporate bond origination via asingle-price auction. In an embodiment of the invention, states of theauction may include NOT OPEN, OPEN, WITHDRAWN, PRICING, CLOSED, RUNNING,ALLOCATED, and FILLED.

In an embodiment of the invention, time is a required component of theauction, and each phase may be captured in the system as a state. In anembodiment of the invention, each state is strictly independent from therest: the auction is in exactly one state at any given time, no twostates overlap, and there is no period of time that is not covered byexactly one state. In an embodiment of the invention, the transitionfrom one state to the next is atomic.

In the NOT_OPEN state, the auction is not yet open. In an embodiment ofthe invention, this state begins at the instant the auction is firstcreated in the system and continues until the transition to the OPENstate. No positions may be created, modified, or cancelled. All auctionsare created in this state, and this is a state into which a transitionfrom another state may not be made. The method and system of the presentinvention may only transition to the OPEN state from the NOT_OPEN state.

In the OPEN state, the auction is open, and positions from qualifiedaccounts and authorized users can be created, modified, or cancelled. Inan embodiment of the invention, this state begins at the moment theauction is opened and continues until the transition to the PRICINGstate or the WITHDRAWN state. Due to vagaries of system timing, thisstate may not be used as the definitive control over when positionoperations are accepted by the method and system of the presentinvention. It may be expected that the duration of this state will befrom the openTime auction attribute through the closeTime auctionattribute. See discussion below about timing.

In the WITHDRAWN state, the auction is withdrawn. This state begins atthe moment the auction is withdrawn and continues indefinitely, or untilit is reset to the OPEN state. It is used to signal that an auction hasbeen suspended or cancelled. In an embodiment of the invention, noposition operations are accepted, though some positions may alreadyexist in the method and system of the present invention.

In the PRICING state, the system is being prepared to accept finalpricing items. This state begins at the moment as close as possible toimmediately following a close time and ends at the transition to theCLOSED state or the WITHDRAWN state. During this state, positionoperations are only allowed by those users with a syndicate roleauthorized. In an embodiment of the invention, a new position for thesyndicate may be entered in order to effect a syndicate long position; atotal available auction attribute may be modified during this state.This amount may be different from the auction attribute announced size,and can be used to effect a syndicate short position.

In the CLOSED state, the auction is closed, and no further positionoperations are allowed. The state begins at the moment the syndicatemanager closes the auction and ends when the auctioneer transitions theauction to the RUNNING state.

In the RUNNING state, the auctioneer, is in the process of calculatingthe clearing value and generating allocations. In an embodiment of theinvention, queries to the book may produce intermediate results. If anerror occurs in the RUNNING state, the auction is reverted to the CLOSEDstate and all allocations are cancelled. At the successful conclusion ofallocation generation, the state is changed to ALLOCATED.

In the ALLOCATED state, the auction has been allocated, and executionshave been created and are available. In an embodiment of the invention,the final auction attributes, such as coupon, price, and otherattributes, may be computed and published by users who have thesyndicate role authorized. For the first few minutes after entering thisstate, the treasuries position attribute may be modified for positionsthat received a fill; this time ends at a close time+final pricing timebut does not start until this state is entered.

In the FILLED state, the auction is filled, and no position operationsor auction operations are allowed. Fills may be transmitted to thirdparties, such as clearing brokers, winning bidders, and/or otherparties. This state begins when the auctioneer has finished generatingfills, and the FILLED state may continue indefinitely.

In an embodiment of the invention, time in an auction may be handled asfollows. Normal position operations may be allowed at certain times.When a position operation is attempted, the position is given atimestamp by the order management system of the method and system of thepresent invention. In an embodiment of the invention, this timestamp isassigned the earliest possible time in the order management system toallow for the earliest value to be used. This timestamp improvesfairness and consistency, in that different operations may takediffering amounts of time, so obtaining a proposed timestamp reducesthis variation. In an embodiment of the invention, this timestamp isthen rounded down to the nearest hundredth of a second.

In an embodiment of the invention, before a position creation,modification, or cancellation is allowed, a proposed timestamp may bechecked against an open time; if the timestamp is greater than or equalto the open time, the timestamp is checked against the close time; ifthe timestamp is less than the close time, then the state of the auctionis checked; if the state of the auction is not WITHDRAWN then theoperation is allowed to succeed. This procedure enables handling of thesituation of accepting a bid received after the open time but strictlybefore the transition to the OPEN state, as well as not accepting a bidreceived after the close time but strictly before the transition out ofthe OPEN state.

In an embodiment of the invention, time issues are also addressed withregards to priority for competitive and non-competitive bids. When anychange is made to any object, a timestamp is recorded by the ordermanagement system for auditing purposes. If the operation results in apriority timestamp being reset, the timestamp of the last change for theposition is used.

In an embodiment of the invention, timing of evaluation for an auctionmay be associated with an auction attribute evalInterval, which isexpressed in seconds. In an embodiment of the invention, specific timesof evaluation may be calculated by working backwards from the closetime, so that the final evaluation interval ends precisely at the closetime. In an embodiment of the invention, those who define auctions maybe cautioned against using an evalInterval that makes for confusingtimestamps.

Referring again to FIG. 6, an end user may initiate an auction of themethod and system of the present invention by logging into the auctionserver 604 in order to identify the end user to the server. Datatransmitted to and from the website may be secured via a well-knownencryption mechanism. FIG. 7 shows an exemplary login screen for thepresent invention. An end user, such as an investor, enters theinvestor's account number 701 and password 702. The user may receive anaccount number 701 and password 702 after registering with the methodand system of the present invention.

In an embodiment of the invention, in order to register with the methodand system of the present invention, an investor may open an account byfilling out a customer application form, signing a customer agreementand participation agreement, and receiving approval from a customeraccount staff associated with the method and system of the presentinvention. In certain instances, an investor may use an existing accountwith a third party broker-dealer designated by staff associated with themethod and system of the present invention as bidder conduits.

Referring again to FIG. 7, the end user is also prompted to enter anauction key 704. In an embodiment of the invention, each auction isannounced one to two days ahead of time. Registered participants arenotified of an auction electronically. Auctions move rapidly, usuallylasting two hours. When registered participants are notifiedelectronically, they may receive an auction key 703 for that givenauction.

If the end user selects initial terms 705, an initial terms screenexemplified by FIG. 8 is shown to the user. FIG. 8 shows details for theauction, including a title 801 and initial terms 802, which may includesuch terms as the issuer, an issue size, a maturity date, a coupon rate,a settlement date, settlement terms, a type of issue, coupon dates, astructure, a format, a quality rating, a benchmark treasury, a maximumbenchmark rate, a minimum/maximum spread, a protected spread, an auctiondate and time, a pricing date and time, a maximum purchase limit, aminimum and multiple investment, a listing designation, soft dollarterms, names of co-managers, and a selling concession.

Referring again to FIG. 7, if the end user selects submit 704, themethod and system of the present invention checks a security database tomatch the account number 701 and password 702 information entered by theend user. If the information entered matches an end user registered inthe system, the system checks the auction key 703 entered by the enduser. If the end user is properly registered and the auction key 703entered is correct, the end user is shown a pre-auction screen asexemplified in FIG. 9.

During the pre-auction phase exemplified by FIG. 9, bids are notaccepted, as shown by the auction progress window 901. During thepre-auction phase and throughout the auction, the end user may be shownauction details 902, which provides details about the auction. Auctionstart 903 shows the start time for the auction, and auction finish 904shows the ending time for the auction. Min/max spread 905 shows alargest and smallest bid spread in basis points over a benchmarkTreasury allowed during the auction.

Protected spread range 906 shows a maximum spread range, under aninitial bid, that an end user may modify a final bid, without cancelingthe end user's existing competitive bid. Improving an initial bid bymore than the protected spread range results in cancellation of theoriginal bid and entry of a new bid with a new timestamp. In theexample, the protected spread range 906 is a 4 basis point spread.Benchmark Treasury 907 relates to a chosen reference U.S. Treasurysecurity of comparable maturity to the bonds being auctioned. Thebenchmark Treasury yield may be used to price the bond after theauction. In an embodiment of the invention, if the benchmark Treasuryyield is above the maximum rate at pricing, the issuer is allowed, butnot required, to cancel the auction.

After an auction has begun, the end user is shown a screen such as theone in FIG. 10. Auction progress window 901 shows the current time andthe time remaining in the auction. Cumulative bid chart 1002 shows thetotal cumulative bids, which is $500 million in the example auctionshown. Cumulative bid chart 1002 also shows the distribution of theinitial bids, cumulatively grouped in a bar chart format by basis pointspread (bps). In the example, there are a total of 24 initial bids, andall 24 initial bids are at or below 105 bps. In the example, 23 bids arebelow 104 bps, which shows that there was (24−23=1) one initial bid at105 bps. This cumulative bid chart provides a clue to the end user as towhat bps the end user may have to bid in order to have a feasible chanceat successfully winning the auction. In the example in FIG. 9, if noneof the bids are modified, the end user knows that a final bid of 105 bpswould presently garner no legitimate chance of winning because there arealready more than $450 million worth of bids at 104 bps and below, andthe total amount of bonds up for auction is between $300 million and$450 million. Only initial bids, not final bids, are shown by thecumulative bid chart 902, but the protected spread range 906 doesprovide a guide for the end user as to where the final bids may fall. Inan embodiment of the invention, the cumulative bid chart 1002 is colorcoded into three colors, one color for bids that may be above ahypothetical clearing price, a second color for bids that may or may notbe above the clearing price, and a third color for bids that would bebelow the clearing price.

If the user clicks or selects nominal chart 1001, a nominal bid chart1102 communicated to the end user, as shown in FIG. 11. Nominal bidchart 1102 shows the number of initial bids, grouped in bar graph form,for each basis point spread. Also shown is the quantity of bondsinitially requested at each basis point spread. In the example shown inFIG. 11, there are only two initial bids at 103 bps, but they accountfor a large quantity of bonds ($110 million worth at 103 bps). In anembodiment of the invention, the nominal bid chart 1102 is color codedinto three colors, one color for bids that may be above a hypotheticalclearing price, a second color for bids that may or may not be above theclearing price, and a third color for bids that would be below theclearing price.

If the user clicks or selects bid data 1103, a bid data table 1202 iscommunicated to the end user, as shown in FIG. 12. Bid data table 1202shows each bid, ordered by bps. In the example, the first bid shown is anoncompetitive bid “N” at a quantity of 10 timestamped at 9:00 ET. In anembodiment of the invention, the entries in the bid data table 1202 arecolor coded into three colors, one color for bids that may be above ahypothetical clearing price, a second color for bids that may or may notbe above the clearing price, and a third color for bids that would bebelow the clearing price. If there are too many bids to display in onescreen for the bid data table 1202, the end user may click or select thesee remaining bids button to show additional bids.

Referring again to FIG. 12, the end user may elect to place a bid byentering bid information in the place bid window 1201. Place bid window1201 appears on the end user's screen when the auction begins andremains on the user screen if the user chooses to cycle through thevarious bid history charts and tables. In an embodiment of theinvention, the end user may choose to place a competitive bid 1203, anon-competitive bid 1208, or both a competitive bid 1203 and anon-competitive bid 1208. For either a competitive bid 1203 or anon-competitive bid 1208, the end user must enter a size 1205. Size 1205is the bid amount, in millions. In an embodiment of the invention, theminimum competitive bid is $1 million and can be increased in incrementsof $1,000. The minimum non-competitive bid is $1,000 and can beincreased in increments of $1,000. An investor may increase the size ofan existing bid by up to 50% and keep the original timestamp. In anembodiment of the invention, increasing the size of a bid by more than50% will result in cancellation of the original bid and entry of a newbid with a new timestamp 1204.

In an embodiment of the invention, for a competitive bid 1203, the enduser must also enter an initial bid 1206 and a final bid 1207. Initialbid 1206 is the spread in basis points of a competitive bid, which isrevealed anonymously to other investors. In an embodiment of theinvention, the final bid 1207 can only be set at or below the initialbid but may not differ from the initial bid by more than the protectedspread range 906. The final bid 1207 may be changed at any time prior tothe end of the auction. Setting the final bid 1207 below the initial bid1206 by more than the protected spread range will result in cancellationof the original bid and entry of a new bid with a new timestamp 1204.

In an embodiment of the invention, max bid 1210 is the maximum amount aspecific investor may bid in a given auction. When added together, thesize of an investor's competitive bid 1203 and noncompetitive bid 1208may not exceed the maximum bid size indicated by max bid 1210. In theexample shown in FIG. 12, the max bid 1210 is $75 million.

If the end user properly enters bid information in place bid window 1201and clicks or selects submit bid 1211, the confirm bid screen shown inFIG. 13 may be communicated to the end user. If the end user hasimproperly entered bid information, such as by entering a bid thatexceeds the maximum bid allowed for a specific investor, an error screensuch as the one shown in FIG. 20 is communicated to the end user. InFIG. 20, the error 2001 describes the mistake to the user in the placebid 1201 window. In the example shown in FIG. 20, the bid exceeded themaximum bid allowed, is communicated to the user.

Referring again to FIG. 12, if the user has properly entered a bid, theconfirm bid screen shown in FIG. 13 may be communicated to the user.Confirm bid window 1301 appears, reminding and summarizing the enduser's previously entered bid information. If the end user has made amistake or changes his or her mind, the end user may click or selectback 1302 to return to a previous place bid screen.

If the end user selects confirm bid 1303, the current bid status screen,as shown in FIG. 14, is communicated to the end user. Current bid statuswindow 1401 contains a current status column 1402 and a modify column1403. Current status column 1402 displays the present bid or bids of theend user. Also communicated to the user is total bid 1404, which is thesum of competitive bid 1203 and non-competitive bid 1208.

If the end user wishes to modify 1403 a bid, the end user may elect tochange the size 1205 of the bid. For a competitive bid 1203, the usermay change the spread for the final bid 1207, subject to constraintssuch as the protected spread range 906. In an embodiment of theinvention, another constraint on modifying the size 1205 of the bid isthat the size a bid may be increased by up to 50% at any time during theauction without changing the timestamp. If the end user increases thequantity of a bid by more than 50%, that existing bid will be cancelled,and a new bid entered with the new size and a new timestamp.

In an embodiment of the invention, as a further constraint, the size ofa bid cannot be decreased without canceling it. An investor may cancelbids at any time during an auction. The method and system of the presentinvention may exclude bidders for any reason, including activity that isdisruptive to the auction process.

In an embodiment of the invention, investors are given a maximum bidsize limit that varies with credit and/or other methods established bythe method and system of the present invention. When added together, thesize of an investor's competitive bid and noncompetitive bid may notexceed the maximum bid size.

If the end user does decide to make a modification and clicks or selectsmodify bid 1406, a screen such as the one shown in FIG. 15 is shown tothe user.

In the example shown in FIG. 15, the end user has chosen to modify thefinal bid 1207 for the end user's competitive bid 1203. The end user mayclick or select back 1501 if the user has made a mistake or changed hisor her mind, or the user may click or select confirm bid 1502 to acceptthe modification 1503 shown.

Referring again to FIG. 14, if the end user clicks or selects cancel bid1405, the cancel bid screen shown in FIG. 21 is communicated to theuser. In the cancel bid window 2101, in the example shown, the end usermay choose to cancel competitive bid 2102, cancel non-competitive bid2103, or cancel both bids 2104.

If in modifying a bid the end user selects a final bid outside of theprotected spread range 906, the review bid window 1601 is communicatedto the end user as shown in FIG. 16. A notation 1602 appears next to theunprotected improper final bid 1207, and a warning 1603 reminds the enduser that accepting the final bid would result in the loss of thecurrent timestamp 1204. If the end user changes his or her mind, he orshe may click or select back 1604. If the end user wishes to continuewith the new bid 1606, and therefore losing the old timestamp 1204, theend user may select submit bid 1605.

In an embodiment of the invention, if at the end of the auction, the enduser has made one or more successful bids, a successful purchase window1701 is communicated to the end user, as exemplified by the screenshotin FIG. 17. Total successful purchase 1704 shows the total purchaseamount, in millions of dollars.

In an embodiment of the invention, soft dollars available 1702 shows theportion of the selling concession designated by an investor to be paidto a non-underwriting broker-dealer. In an embodiment of the invention,a portion of the selling concession on each deal will be available toinvestors on a soft dollar basis. In an embodiment of the invention,winning bids with earlier timestamps are given a greater fraction of theselling concession in soft dollars. Investors may assign soft dollars toaccounts of their choice. In an embodiment of the invention, investorshave up to 24 hours after a deal prices to complete their soft dollardesignations.

Size of benchmark for sale 1703 allows an investor to set an amount ofthe benchmark Treasury to sell, up to 15 minutes after the end of theauction. If the end user enters a dollar amount and clicks or selectssell treasuries 1705, that amount of treasuries will be sold. Within thefirst fifteen minutes after an auction, an end user may set and changethe amount of the benchmark Treasury bonds the end user wishes to sell.The sale may be made at the prevailing market price at the time the dealprices, or approximately 30 minutes after the conclusion of an auction.

Auction results 1705 shows a clearing spread 1706, a final deal size1707, and a time of final pricing 1708. Clearing spread 1706 shows thelowest spread in basis points over the benchmark Treasury that resultsin the sale of all of the bonds up to the final deal size 1707.

Final deal size 1707 shows the aggregate number of bonds to be sold andmay be set by the issuer of the bonds a prespecified time before the endof auction. Time of final pricing 1708 shows the final terms of a bondissue, with for example, the yield, price, and coupon set approximatelyone half-hour after the end of the auction.

If an end user fails to make one or more successful bids at theconclusion of the auction, a screen such as the one shown in FIG. 18 andcontinued in FIG. 19 is communicated to the end user. Auction results1801, the end user's bid or bids 1803, and initial auction terms 1802are communicated to the unsuccessful end user.

In an embodiment of the invention, the method and system of the presentinvention uses a modified Dutch Auction format. In a Dutch Auction,winning bidders pay a market-clearing price, that is, the highest pricethat sells out all securities offered in the auction.

In an embodiment of the invention, at the end of the auction, orders arefilled working from the lowest-spread bids up to the spread that sellsout the entire offering. All who bid below the clearing spread havetheir orders filled at the clearing spread. Bids at the clearing spreadare awarded in timestamp order. In the event of ties in spread andtimestamp, bonds are awarded pro-rata. If the last accepted bid at theclearing spread requests more bonds than are available, all remainingbonds may be awarded within the final deal size to the bidder.

In an embodiment of the invention, if the benchmark Treasury bond yieldmoves up by a pre-specified number of basis points during an auction,the auction will be cancelled. If there are not enough orders to fillthe final deal size announced by the issuer, the auction will also becancelled.

In an embodiment of the invention, successful bidders at the end of anauction are notified electronically. Basic information about theauctioned bond are publicly available at a website associated with themethod and system of the present invention after the conclusion of anauction. Such information may include, for example, size, yield, coupon,and maturity. Further details about the outcome of an auction and thedemographics of bidders may be made available to those who are awardedbonds.

In an embodiment of the invention, bond pricing occurs approximately 30minutes after the auction terminates. The clearing spread is added tothe benchmark treasury rate to obtain the auction yield. The coupon rateon the bond may become the auction yield rounded down to the nearest ⅛%.The bond price that corresponds to the auction yield and coupon rate maybe calculated to three decimal places. Bonds may be made available totrade shortly after pricing, subject completion of necessarydocumentation.

It will be understood by those skilled in these arts that this exemplarybond auction process described above, may equally be used for equitysecurities, commodities, and other types of securities.

Having described the invention in terms of a preferred embodiment, itwill be recognized by those skilled in the art that various types ofgeneral purpose computer hardware may be substituted for theconfiguration described above to achieve an equivalent result.Similarly, it will be appreciated that arithmetic logic circuits areconfigured to perform each required means in the claims for processinginternet communications between bidder, issuers and auction server nodesIt will be apparent to those skilled in the art that modifications andvariations of the preferred embodiment are possible, which fall withinthe true spirit and scope of the invention as measured by the followingclaims.

1. An auction server node in a computer network having one or more usernodes for conducting an auction run by an auction adviser for awardingsecurities from an issuer to bidders of the auction, such that theauction server node provides for: a. real-time monitoring of the auctionas it occurs; b. a bid mechanism for receiving competitive bids from thebidders at the user nodes, wherein the competitive bids include: i. aquantity of securities to be purchased, ii. an initial price revealed tothe other bidders, and iii. a firm price not revealed to the otherbidders and within a predetermined range of the initial price, whereinthe predetermined range is set for the bidders; c. determination of asingle market clearing price that allocates to the bidders all of thesecurities in the auction; d. an incremental adjustment of the marketclearing price by at least one of the auction advisor and the issuer;and e. an allocation of the securities to the bidders at the adjustedclearing price.
 2. An auction server node according to claim 1, whereinthe securities include equity securities or debt securities.
 3. Anauction server node according to claim 1, wherein the securities includecommodities traded on a licensed commodity exchange.
 4. An server nodeaccording to claim 3, wherein the commodities include gold or silver. 5.An auction server node according to claim 1, wherein the securitiesinclude money market instruments.
 6. An auction server node according toclaim 5, wherein the money market instruments include one of UnitedStates treasury bills, bank certificates of deposit, commercial paper,and repurchase agreements.
 7. An auction server node according to claim1, wherein the securities comprise one of corporate bonds, municipalbonds, mortgage-backed bonds, emerging market bonds, and junk bonds. 8.An auction server node according to claim 1, wherein the bid mechanismis an open Dutch auction process.
 9. An auction server node according toclaim 1, wherein each of the initial price and the firm price areexpressed in terms of basis point increments.
 10. An auction server nodeaccording to claim 1, wherein each of the initial price and the firmprice are expressed in currency.
 11. An auction server node according toclaim 1, wherein an identity of the bidder associated with an initialprice is not revealed to the other bidders.
 12. An auction server nodeaccording to claim 1, wherein the bid mechanism further receivesnon-competitive bids which specify a desired quantity of securities andno price limitation.
 13. An auction server node according to claim 12,wherein the securities are allocated to non-competitive bids beforecompetitive bids.
 14. An auction server according to claim 1, whereinthe adjusted clearing price equals the market clearing price.
 15. Anauction server according to claim 1, wherein the adjusted clearing priceis greater than the market clearing price.
 16. An auction serveraccording to claim 1, wherein the adjusted clearing price is less thanthe market clearing price.
 17. An auction server according to claim 1,wherein the allocation of the securities assigns the securities on a prorata basis for competitive bids at the adjusted clearing price.
 18. Anauction server according to claim 1, wherein the allocation of thesecurities assigns the securities on a time stamp basis for competitivebids at the adjusted clearing price.
 19. An auction server according toclaim 1, wherein the quantity of securities to be purchased includes: i.an initial quantity revealed to the other bidders, and ii. a firmquantity not revealed to the other bidders and within a pre-determinedrange of the initial quantity.